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Abstract
Feminists have noted the injustice of the institution of marriage and the asymmetric
power dynamics within gender-structured marriages. Recently, feminists have found an
unexpected supporter of this struggle against marriage in some liberal political theorists.
I argue that this new wave of interest in the wrongness of marriage within liberalism
reveals shortcomings from a feminist perspective. While some liberals fail to realise that
instead of being disestablished, the institution of marriage should be radically reformed,
others do not recognise that such a reform should be theorised by starting from our
non-idealised conditions of gender inequality and from an analysis of how the institution
of marriage intersects with other spheres of gender injustice. This article provides
recommendations for the radical reform of marriage by following some methodological
premises of feminist theory. To illustrate how the reform of marriage should be
theorised, it focuses on the intersection between the sphere of gender injustice rep-
resented by immigration and that of marriage.
Keywords
Feminist methodology, gender inequality, immigration, liberalism, marriage, non-ideal
theory
Feminism and marriage have never experienced connubial bliss. Feminist scholars
have highlighted the vulnerability and oppression suﬀered by women within
gender-structured marriages, while also challenging the justice of the institution
of marriage. Some have noted that marriage has historically been ‘the vehicle
through which the apparatus of state can shape the gender order’ (Cott, 2000: 3).
Marriage has represented a fundamental institution whereby the sexual subordina-
tion of women, heteronormativity and inequality between genders has been
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formally regulated.1 Those feminist scholars who worked to change the institution
of marriage have recently found supporters in certain liberal political and legal
philosophers who, by oﬀering both feminist and liberal rationales, argue in favour
of either a radical reform or the disestablishment of the institution of marriage.2
This article focuses on these recent liberal attempts to theorise the institution of
marriage. These attempts seem to disagree with liberals’ traditional silence regard-
ing the profound injustice and oppression suﬀered by women within the family and
as a result of marital ties.3 This substantial shift in liberal theory is worthy of
scrutiny as it brings new insights into the feminist debate over marriage.
The purpose of my argument is twofold. First, it aims to show, from a feminist
perspective, that these liberal attempts reveal serious shortcomings. While some
observers fail to understand that the institution of marriage should be radically
reformed instead of disestablished, others do not recognise that such reform should
be theorised by starting from our non-ideal conditions of gender inequality and
from an analysis of how the institution of marriage intersects with other spheres of
gender injustice. Second, the article provides positive normative recommendations
for the radical reform of marriage. Before proceeding, one preliminary observation
must be made. The (feminist) angle from which I criticise the discussed liberal
proposals to change the institution of marriage can seem inappropriate. It could
be argued that such liberal attempts respond to the need to determine how a liberal
state should regulate adult relationships rather than assess how this can be per-
formed in a feminist way. For these authors, gender equality is not the only value at
stake. However, it is this objection that undervalues the intellectual enterprise of
much of this work. Not only do some of these authors incorporate feminist insights
into their arguments, they are also declared feminist liberals whose proposals depict
liberalism and feminism as a sort of ‘tautology’.4 In other words, for some of these
scholars, the aim is to explain how adult relationships should be regulated accord-
ing to liberal and feminist values, thus asking whether such proposals advancing
feminist goals are legitimate.5
In the ﬁrst section of this article, I argue that disestablishing marriage through
private contracts or the substitution of civil unions for civil marriage is likely to
render women more vulnerable because the process misses the opportunity to
shape adult relationships in a more egalitarian fashion. In the second section, I
show how the radical reform of the institution of marriage should be theorised
according to feminist methodology: starting from non-idealised circumstances
and focusing on the intersection of marriage with various spheres of gender
injustice. This means that marriage law is not the sole factor that must be tailored
to the actual conditions of gender inequality and the intersection of the spheres
of gender injustice. Many spheres of gender injustice, which may not appear
immediately connected to that of marriage, do greatly aﬀect intimate relation-
ships. In the ﬁnal section, I discuss how the radical reform of marriage should be
theorised by using the example of the intersections between marriage and immi-
gration law.
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Marriage and gender inequality:
Disestablishment or radical reform?
Liberalism has generally remained silent about the profound injustice and oppres-
sion suﬀered by women within the family and as a result of marital ties. One of the
ﬁrst and few liberals to examine the family as a locus of injustice was Susan Moller
Okin. As I elaborate later, some of the insights provided by Okin are fundamental to
theorising the radical reform of the institution of marriage.6 Okin famously argues
that the vulnerability experienced by women through marriage is interwoven with
the discrimination they face in other social and political domains (1989: 134–169).
I note that the new group of liberal scholars questioning the institution of marriage
neglects or does not fully follow Okin’s invaluable insights. The majority of these
recent liberal accounts of marriage tend to argue in favour of disestablishing mar-
riage through private contracts or by substituting civil unions for civil marriage,
open to everyone, independently of their sexual orientation. For instance, Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler envision an ideal world in which the meaning of
marriage is entirely deﬁned by religious and private institutions. By merely signing
private contracts, individuals are allowed to enter into relationships at will
(2008: 377).7 For Sunstein and Thaler, this imaginary scenario could be easily rea-
lised even in real societies and may solve the dilemma concerning the recognition of
same-sex relationships in a way that can be appealing to both progressives and
conservatives. The separation between contractual unions – regulated and available
to everyone regardless of sexuality – by means of ordinary law, and marriage –
regulated and restricted by private institutions – would be approved by a diverse
array of perspectives rather than on the basis of a shared rationale.
Similarly, Tamara Metz argues in favour of the disestablishment of the institu-
tion of marriage. For Metz, marriage in pluralistic societies requires the formal
involvement of a public authority, and the marital union should be primarily
understood as a tie binding individuals to an ethical authority. Metz contends
that to maintain its neutrality towards diﬀerent conceptions of the good, the
(liberal) state cannot perform ‘the role of ethical authority’ (2010: 115). By granting
marriage licenses, the state establishes a particular form of intimate and communal
existence. Thus, it interferes with individuals’ freedom to pursue their personal
beliefs. Instead, the state should protect persons in dependent relationships by
creating an ‘intimate care giving union status’ that expands on the idea of civil
unions, including all caring relationships (Metz, 2010: 113).8 The proposal to pri-
vatise marriage9 overlooks the important role the state can play in constructing
adult relationships that improve gender equality.10 Such neglect has both practical
and expressive deleterious eﬀects. Practically, a great deal of vulnerability between
partners would be allowed. Sunstein and Thaler, like many supporters of the
regulation of adult ties through private contracts, note that one of the appeals of
the disestablishment of marriage is that individuals can freely choose the terms of
their unions (2008: 379–180). In other words, private contracts are appreciated for
their ﬂexibility.
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Consequently, although violations of persons’ integrity, such as sexual assaults,
battering and minor marriages, can still be banned (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008:
379), other unequal terms must be permitted to maintain the ﬂexibility such con-
tracts are claimed to possess. Therefore, under a regime of private contracts, a
woman with a low source of income who decides to enter into an intimate contract
with a wealthier partner can agree to disadvantageous ﬁnancial terms, such as
renouncing economic compensation if the contract is terminated. Such an arrange-
ment is likely to reinforce the already unequal power dynamics between the part-
ners and to place the woman in a vulnerable position during and after the
relationship. While this pitfall seems inevitable when adult intimate relationships
are regulated only through private contracts, one may suppose that the substitution
of civil unions for civil marriage, such as the type proposed by Metz, can oﬀer
women more protection. Nevertheless, as Laurie Shrage observes, for such unions
to encompass the variety of caring and familiar ties between adults present in
society – as Metz suggests – they must ‘be ﬂexible to the point that they will be
indistinguishable from privately negotiated contracts’ (2013: 12). Thus, it is likely
that even civil unions will be unable to guarantee women adequate protection.11
Similarly, Metz’s proposal reveals the same ﬂaw that Sunstein and Thaler’s private
contracts revealed. Not only would disestablishing marriage fail to protect enough
individuals from the uncertainty and complexity that characterise intimate ties, but
it would also allow women, who are generally already the more vulnerable party, to
enter into profoundly unequal relationships.
For the state, the refusal to establish a public understanding of marriage would
also have important expressive losses. Arguably, marriage has traditionally repre-
sented the way in which adults can publicly state the importance of their long-term
commitments. When the state decides who can marry it also passes judgement on
which kinds of relationships are worthy of state protection and recognition. This
entails making a judgement on the individuals who have such commitments by
implicitly conﬁrming or negating their equal status as citizens through the provi-
sion or denial of the right to build a family. Leaving the role of deciding the
understanding and purpose of such an expressive institution to private associations –
particularly religious ones – would mean oﬀering them a signiﬁcant opportunity to
shape adult relationships through their potentially unequal and sexist values.12
Conversely, by maintaining control of the institution of civil marriage and radically
reforming it, the state can change the traditional public perception of this powerful
institution from chauvinist to egalitarian. The long-standing idea that marriage
should be based on reproduction and (legitimate) sexual intercourse, whereby
women’s bodies have been historically controlled, can be rejected. Instead, as
Linda McClain argues, civil marriage can recognise the importance of adult
long-term commitments for promoting important values within a society, such as
care and responsibility, and protect the ones in these relationships from potential
abuses (2006: 191–222). In this manner, the state can gradually transform personal
and intimate ties in a more (gender) egalitarian fashion by, for example, insisting
on and encouraging a more equal domestic division of labour. Moreover, the state
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would have an invaluable opportunity to publicly recognise the equal status of
adult ties that have been traditionally decried and of the citizens who have them.
The crucial expressive role that marriage plays in societies is conﬁrmed by the
heated debate over same-sex marriage. One of the most signiﬁcant aspects of this
discussion is the symbolic importance that both conservative associations, such as
churches, and some LGBT organisations place on the word ‘marriage’, even when
it is used to deﬁne publicly-recognised personal arrangements. Even a large number
of progressive members of the clergy who acknowledge the necessity of same-sex
couples having their civil rights protected disagree that such a public recognition
should take the form of civil marriage.13 Yet, even in countries with legal systems
that recognise same-sex civil unions, the ﬁght to extend the right to marry to same-
sex couples continues.14 This may suggest that, within societies with a history of
sexual discrimination, formally extending the term ‘marriage’ to previously discri-
minated couples would symbolically publicly recognise the equal status of non-
heteronormative families – a symbolic potential that other public arrangements,
such as civil unions, may not have. This is because the term ‘marriage’ still sig-
niﬁcantly matters, precisely to those parts of civil societies denying the equal value
of non-heterosexual unions. In other words, giving same-sex couples the right to
marry would, for the state, convey a public message of status-equality that may
transform civil society. Although combating heterosexism within society does not
stop at guaranteeing same-sex marriage (Ferguson, 2007: 41), same-sex marriage
may be a necessary and initial step towards aﬃrming the equality of same-sex
relationships and their familiar ties. Radically reforming the institution of marriage
rather than disestablishing it is the best way to gradually transform adult relation-
ships according to the public value of gender equality.15 But how should such a
radical reform be theorised?16
Theorising the radical reform of marriage
Elizabeth Brake proposes reforming marriage in a manner attuned to feminist (and
liberal) values (2012: 5): ‘minimal marriage’ (hereafter MM). She acknowledges the
signiﬁcance of radically reforming marriage instead of simply disestablishing it.
Brake’s proposal is worthy of scrutiny because it represents the most recent and
considered liberal account of how marriage should be reformed. According to
Brake, the state can impose restrictions on citizens’ private lives insofar as these
restrictions are justiﬁable in terms of ‘public reasons’. Drawing on Rawls’s political
liberalism, Brake claims that decisions concerning the basic structure of society,
which includes marriage and family, must be justiﬁable by means of political
arguments that do not rely on particular comprehensive religious and moral doc-
trines (2012: 135–136). Brake contends that public reason requires a system of MM
that favours and supports the social bases of adult caring relationships – social
bases that the state is obliged to secure. Speciﬁcally, MM would support every
caring relationship between two (or more) nondependent adults (Brake, 2012: 156).
For Brake, all persons involved in caring relationships, regardless of the sex
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or sexuality of, or the existence of sexual intimacy between the parties, may be
granted only the rights and entitlements supporting their particular relationship
(2012: 160–161). To be in a caring relationship, the parties must ‘know and [be]
known to each other, have ongoing direct contact and share a history’ (Brake,
2012: 160). Nevertheless, their exchange of marital rights could be non-mutual,
and all of the legitimate entitlements could be undistributed altogether. Thus,
among the ﬁxed list of the rights and beneﬁts that MM grants, adults can
choose those they consider ﬁt for their relationship. They may also decide to
exchange some entitlements with one partner and some with another, without
any of the partners in question being required to reciprocate.
Drawing on (even radical) feminist critiques of the injustice of marriage and
injustices within marriage, Brake begins her analysis by expressing deep concern
about how marriage is largely an unjust institution in our societies, which sustains
heteronormativity. Brake also claims that radical reform is necessary. Nevertheless,
Brake theorises such a reform by envisioning ‘an ideal, liberal egalitarian society’
(2012: 160). The bundles of non-mutual and non-exclusive rights and obligations
that the reformed institution of marriage would grant are decided by starting from
certain idealised conditions. Brake explicitly assumes that the society within which
MM is theorised is constituted by egalitarian institutions and that equality is
guaranteed. Moreover, she imagines adults entering MM as nondependent persons,
particularly in ﬁnancial matters (Brake, 2012: 156). Finally, she implicitly brackets
the fact that adults belong to diﬀerent structural groups within society that inevi-
tably condition their expectations and opportunities.17 She does not consider the
extent to which being a member of groups formed along the lines of, for instance,
gender, sexuality, race, ability and class may aﬀect the power dynamics within
personal intimate relationships. Brake believes that constructing marriage in such
an idealised world is not a mere speculative enterprise. Conversely, because it is
unconstrained by unfavourable factors, this model can guide the reform of the
institution of marriage in our non-ideal circumstances. In addition to representing
a device for social criticism, MM is regarded as a powerful tool for change,
although it requires some adjustments to be able ‘to respond to actual injustices’
(Brake, 2012: 190). In other words, for Brake, theorising the reform of marriage in
two stages (i.e. starting from idealised conditions and then moving to real non-ideal
circumstance) does not diminish the egalitarian potential of MM.
To identify the problems that Brake’s approach to marriage creates, I propose
some fundamental methodological premises of feminist theorising. These premises
are crucial to thinking positively about how an eﬀective reform of marriage should
be performed. Feminism is undoubtedly a heterogeneous tradition. However,
despite discrepancies in theories and approaches, the majority of feminist scholars
agree that feminism is also a ‘particular mode of questioning, an orientation and set
of commitments’ that guides normative theorising (Young, 1997: 5). Feminist the-
orising is driven by the particular ideal and goal of gender equality.18 Many fem-
inists highlight that institutional change should be proposed by analysing how
various public and private spheres of gender inequality intersect with and mutually
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reinforce one another to maintain gender injustice and by starting from women’s
actual conditions.19 Let me start by discussing how the intersection of spheres of
gender inequality works. As an example of how feminist insight into the intersec-
tion between spheres of gender inequality is grounded, consider how health
inequality and poverty spill over into one another. On the one hand, even where
there is universal access to healthcare, women in poverty are more vulnerable to
health problems, including mental health problems such as depression, PTSD and
mental illnesses (Rogers, 2006: 352; American Psychological Association, 2013).
On the other hand, poor reproductive health outcomes, such as early childbearing,
maternal morbidity and unintended or mistimed pregnancy, can increase women’s
poverty or prevent women from escaping it (Green, 2008). Gendered inequalities in
health are reinforced by gendered poverty, while gendered poverty is entrenched by
gendered health issues.
Marriage lies at the heart of the intersection between various spheres of gender
injustice. Gender inequalities that persist within marital relationships, such as the
unequal division of domestic and caring labour, hinder the opportunities women
may have elsewhere by preventing them from being equal competitors in the job
market (Pateman, 1989: 119). Thus, gender inequality at home reinforces gender
inequality in the workplace. Consequently, the lack of substantively equal oppor-
tunities between women and men in diverse areas of public existence ensures the
unequal distribution of power among persons in the domestic realm and seriously
aﬀects decisions regarding the personal regulation of private life (Okin, 1989:
128–129; Fineman, 2004: 57–59). The pernicious idea that women and men
occupy diﬀerent positions within society – based on which power asymmetry
within personal relations is justiﬁed – may be reinforced by the limited presence
of women in politics and managerial roles. Any radical reform of civil marriage
should carefully consider how the diﬀerent spheres of gender inequality spill over
into one another in a determinate society. Such a reform should also modify the
legal construct of marriage and the bundles of rights and duties it grants, such as by
countering the eﬀects of gender injustice, protecting women and fostering equal
adult relationships. It is worth stressing that the particular intersections of the
spheres of gender injustice aﬀecting marriage may vary within diﬀerent societies.
Thus, the theorisation of the radical reform of marriage should be sensitive to its
particular context of implementation.
A further methodological premise of feminist normative theorising is that theory
should be grounded in women’s actual conditions. Women’s particular experiences
and the ways in which they address their conditions are not simply an important
source of knowledge; they represent the ineluctable starting point of (feminist)
normative theorising.20 This does not mean that there is no place for ideal
theory in feminist theory. Envisioning a world in which the ideal of gender equality
is realised constitutes an important device of social criticism that enables us to see
how far our societies are from that world (Abbey, 2011: 223). Nevertheless, a
completely diﬀerent question is how to move from our current society to a society
where gender equality has been realised (Mills, 2005: 181–182). This question can
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only be approached and answered by examining women’s actual conditions. In
brief, when institutional reform is not theorised by starting from the non-idealised
conditions of women, such reform may be counterproductive because it may
increase women’s vulnerability or, at best, leave gender inequality largely intact.
Marriage is no exception. Its radical reform should be theorised by starting from
the actual conditions in which women enter and remain in marital unions. When
marriage reform is carried out, idealising the conditions in which women live and
abstracting from important dimensions of gender inequality is a deleterious starting
point. This is because such reform is likely to neglect the actual experience of many
women, and miss whether and how the dimensions of gender inequality it has
abstracted from aﬀect the position of women within marital ties.
As mentioned, Brake theorises the radical reform of marriage by starting from
an idealised society and, at a subsequent stage, deploying the proposal to guide
reform in actual societies. As Brake would certainly recognise, such an idealised
society is arguably diﬀerent from our reality. The idealised conditions assumed by
Brake (i.e. egalitarian institutions, adult economic non-dependency and equal
structural membership) must be considered and analysed to propose a reform
of marriage that reduces gender vulnerability and promotes gender equality.
In other words, the assumptions made by Brake can be deﬁned as particularly
‘bad idealisations’ because they refer to injustices that cannot be bracketed while
theorising about justice.21 Although contemporary liberal and democratic socie-
ties are still unequal, many women enter intimate relationships as ﬁnancially
dependent on their partners, and membership in disadvantaged structural
groups, such as that of women, still aﬀects individual expectations and opportu-
nities. These facts are arguably injustices that are relevant to marriage. If the
regulation of marriage is theorised in an idealised world, where these injustices
have been abstracted, the normative proposal will be blind to these problems of
gender justice. Alternatively, when used to guide a reform of marriage in a non-
idealised society, this proposal would face a problematic alternative: either main-
taining its original tenets, thereby compounding gender vulnerability, or losing its
distinctiveness.
Non-idealised theorising is also necessary to understanding how marriage inter-
sects with various economic, social and symbolic spheres of gender injustice. First,
in an idealised egalitarian world, it can be assumed that many spheres of gender
injustice that do spill over into marriage are just. Envisioning these spheres as just
means, a fortiori, that their intersection with marriage can be considered just.
Nevertheless, it is exactly this intersection that must be analysed to radically
reform marriage according to the value of gender equality. Conversely, focusing
on actual non-idealised conditions is likely to point to some particularly unequal
spheres of gender injustice that spill over into marriage. Second, it is fair to assume
that in diﬀerent societies, the diﬀerent spheres that spill over into marriage may
intersect in a contextual fashion. Thus, a non-idealised theorisation of marriage is
more likely to be sensitive to important context speciﬁcities than an idealised
theorisation.
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The way the bundle of rights and beneﬁts granted by marriage should be
exchanged by partners must be sensitive to the power dynamics present within
societies. Take the phenomenon of internalised oppression as an example. In socie-
ties where expectations, roles and status are still distributed according to structural
membership, persons may have internalised some inferior images of themselves.
Such a factor, which, arguably, contemporary liberal and democratic states have
not eradicated by endorsing anti-discriminatory laws and formal equality of oppor-
tunity, does aﬀect how individuals establish intimate relationships. This factor may
undermine the possibility of them entering into marriage on an equal footing.
Therefore, under these circumstances, leaving individuals to decide how to
exchange the bundles of rights and duties that marriage grants, as MM does, is
likely to increase interpersonal inequality and vulnerability because decisions may
be the reﬂection of oppressive attitudes. Conversely, persons would be more pro-
tected and equality would be better promoted if some ﬁxed directives on how
parties should exchange beneﬁts and burdens were implemented to counter social
phenomena that can place parties in unequal positions. For example, the less
egalitarian a society is, the more symmetrical the exchange of beneﬁts and burdens
between partners should be.
Moreover, the speciﬁc rights and duties that marriage should grant depend on
certain conditions of inequality within a society and how the various spheres of
gender inequality and vulnerability intersect with one another to sustain gender
injustice. Brake claims that to avoid compounding gender vulnerability, some of
the rights and duties that would not be granted by MM in an ideal society (e.g.
alimony) should be retained in a transitional stage (2012: 194). Although this
caveat shows how Brake is not unaware of the signiﬁcance of the context, it
does note a tension in her position. As previously argued, because our societies
are substantially diﬀerent from the idealised context in which the original proposal
of MM is theorised, the range of rights and duties that MM would have to grant in
the ‘transitional’ stage is bound to be more extensive than Brake recognises. In
other words, in our non-idealised societies, MM would not be minimal. This means
that the application of MM to non-idealised contexts is likely to create tension
between the need to maintain the distinctiveness of the proposal of MM by con-
ceding some rights and obligations that would not normally be conferred and the
endeavour to protect and empower women, which would result in granting so large
a bundle of rights and duties that MM would be extremely directive and ‘extensive’.
In non-ideal societies, there is a tension between the consistency of MM (i.e. being
minimal) and the desire to promote gender equality. Therefore, MM would either
retain its distinctiveness with serious costs in terms of gender equality or become
unclear about why the idealised theorisation of MM would be a necessary step
towards changing the existing institution of marriage.
Conversely, when marriage reform is theorised under non-idealised ideal condi-
tions and by following the recommendations I have proposed, we do not face such
tension, and the goal of advancing gender equality does not risk being sacriﬁced.
Indeed, such a goal would drive the very reform of marriage by dictating which
Nuti 293
particular rights and duties marriage should grant and how parties should
exchange them. However, one may be concerned that the theorisation of marriage
under non-idealised conditions may not be a very powerful tool for change. It is
commonly argued that the problem with non-ideal theory lies in its being overly
conservative and complicit with the status quo.22 Nevertheless, this concern does
not apply to the non-idealised theorisation of marriage I am proposing. In fact, if
we are concerned with the justice of marriage, we should also devote our time to
radically changing those spheres of gender injustice that intersect with marriage.
First, the relevant spheres of gender injustice must be identiﬁed. Second, we
should attempt to tailor marriage law to minimise the spillover of these spheres
into marriage. Third, we need to require joint work on the part of diﬀerent areas of
law and policymaking to directly change those spheres whose injustice impacts
marriage. Thus, we may need to enhance women’s economic independence and
address other spheres of gender injustice that impact marriage to promote its
justice. In other words, owing to the profound impact that various spheres of
gender injustice have on marriage, measures reducing these injustices should
be carefully theorised as central and integral components of the transformation
of personal adult relationships. To illustrate this fundamental yet under-theorised
recommendation and show the great potential of the non-idealised theorisation of
marriage, I will consider how immigration, as one sphere of gender injustice inter-
secting with marriage, should be radically changed if we want to render marriage
more just.23
Gendered immigration and marriage
In a world in which states’ borders are strictly regulated, being married to someone
of the opposite sex who is a citizen of a foreign country considerably increases one’s
chances to enter and settle in that country. This is because an alien spouse of a
citizen of a foreign country has (usually) the right to reunite with her partner. Thus,
she can more easily move permanently to the place where her partner lives. The
privilege accorded to (heterosexual) marriage by immigration laws leads to three
immediate consequences. First, persons who are in unorthodox forms of adult
relationships are unjustly prevented from joining their partners. Second, faced
with the reasonable prospect of obtaining residence in another country, persons
are tempted to enter into exploitative marriages and expose themselves to extreme
dangers, as illustrated by the infamous phenomenon of ‘mail-order brides’. Third,
after having been accepted in a country under a spouse visa, women are likely to
remain in oppressive relationships due to the fear of forced deportation. According
to Brake, eligibility for spousal immigration would be retained as one of the few
entitlements obtainable under MM (2012: 161). Therefore, MM would extend the
right to immigrate to a broad array of adult caring relationships, thus oﬀering
individuals more viable options. Most importantly, Brake accepts the legitimacy
of borders by claiming that states have the right to investigate whether a marriage
is a sham and whether an applicant should be allowed to enter a country based
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on family reuniﬁcation (2012: 165). Therefore, it becomes crucial to see how the
vulnerability that persons experience in intimate relationships, when they are so
tied to immigration status, can be reduced. In other words, if we are concerned with
the justice of marriage and how to render women less vulnerable in this respect – as
Brake is (2012: 205) – immigration law must be considered one of the spheres of
gender injustice that impacts marriage. Thus, changes in immigration law must be
theorised as an integral component of the project of regulating adults’ intimate
relationships in a just fashion. I here explore the sphere of gender injustice yielded
by immigration law under non-idealised conditions.
According to most of the immigration systems implemented by Western coun-
tries, three categories of immigration applicants are regarded as particularly eligible
for immigration status: political refugees, highly qualiﬁed professionals and
spouses of current citizens (Abrams, 2009: 41). Excluding the ﬁrst subgroup,
whose exceptionality is nearly unanimously accepted, the other two classes of
claimants are worthy of consideration because they are extremely gendered cate-
gories. Although these categories are deﬁned in a neutral gendered language, they
aﬀect women and men diﬀerently (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 24). A person’s status as a
highly skilled worker for immigration purposes depends on having previously
acquired the abilities and qualiﬁcations that are judged signiﬁcant by the host
country. Globally, women tend to have more limited access to education and are
less likely to have gained a documentable professional experience. Thus, it is not
surprising that, statistically, women compose the majority of individuals entering
into a foreign state by means of their personal relationships with citizens (Abrams,
2009: 41). In other words, as a result of the global structural gendered inequalities
that put women and men in diﬀerent positions, the privilege accorded to skilled
workers and family ties within immigration law is inexorably gendered in its
impact. To decrease the vulnerability of women in entering into oppressive rela-
tionships to immigrate, states should undertake certain actions. They should
broaden the categories of acceptance of immigrants so that women may have a
better chance of entering a country without relying on a relationship with a citizen
or settled immigrant. For example, states can introduce gender quotas on immi-
gration particularly directed at women from developing countries who are unlikely
to qualify as skilled workers.
In addition to oﬀering women more substantial opportunities to enter other
countries, governments should address immigrant women’s vulnerability in mar-
riage once they have been accepted into a country. Because many states, such as the
UK, require immigrants to have a high annual salary to settle within their borders,
and women – owing to their likely disadvantaged conditions that induced them to
immigrate – often do not have this, states can incentivise companies to hire women
from developing countries by granting tax allowances or oﬀering subsidies to those
companies sponsoring such women.24 More opportunities for immigrant women in
the workplace of the host society would give them less incentive to enter or stay in
abusive marriages because they would have other routes to apply for a residence
permit. Additionally, states should protect immigrant women who have applied
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to remain in a country through spousal sponsorship. States should particularly
counter the widespread phenomenon of domestic violence within adult relation-
ships. This is particularly pressing in the case of immigrant women attempting to
settle in a new country via spousal sponsorship. Indeed, the fact that the immigra-
tion status of these women is completely dependent on their partner’s will puts
them in a particularly vulnerable position. Thus, states should facilitate exit
options for immigrant women in such situations. For instance, in the case of the
UK, the state should decrease, rather than increase, the length of time that indivi-
duals on a spousal visa must wait before they can apply to live in the UK perma-
nently so that immigrant women are not encouraged to remain in unequal
relationships without recourse for protection for several years.25 Second, to give
women more substantial exit options, the UK should strengthen the economic
power of immigrant women by improving the mechanisms through which survivors
of domestic violence can apply for welfare beneﬁts and ensuring that access to
beneﬁts is not limited for those women who do not speak English.
These changes are compatible with both a two-stage theorisation of marriage,
such as the one proposed by Brake, and with the non-idealised theorisation that I
have advanced. In line with MM, one can claim that although in an idealised
society women presumably are not disadvantaged vis-a-vis immigration, under
conditions of gender inequality MM would most likely entail making some changes
to immigration law. Nevertheless, where the two theorisations of marriage diﬀer is
the radicality of the changes prescribed. When the intersection between marriage
and immigration is theorised starting from non-idealised conditions, it becomes
evident that the changes demanded above are necessary but insuﬃcient for tackling
gender injustice in immigration and the full extent of the interplay between immi-
gration law and the regulation of adults’ personal ties. For instance, the introduc-
tion of gender quotas on immigration would provide only to some women the
opportunity to enter a country without marrying a citizen. Only those who have
entered the country under a student visa and those who are highly skilled
and seeking an employment sponsor can eﬀectively take advantage of the state’s
creation of incentives for companies to hire immigrant women from developing
countries. Such changes would only mitigate, rather than eradicate, the unjust ways
in which immigration law intersects with marriage.
Changing the sphere of gender immigration to avoid the injustices caused by its
spillover into marriage would entail additional radical actions. It seems that the
very assumption that Brake makes in her theorisation of marriage, which she does
not challenge at a second stage, i.e. the legitimacy of border control, should be
questioned. In other words, to achieve marriage justice, states should move
towards an open-borders regime.26 This can be argued by starting from non-
idealised conditions. In our non-idealised world, the constraints that women face
on entering a foreign country, as well as once they are in that country, depend on
the conditions under which they can enter and be admitted in the ﬁrst place.
Although many immigration regimes in principle extend eligibility for immigration
status not just to those who aim to reunite with their families, women de facto tend
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to be admitted under spousal visas, thereby becoming particularly vulnerable. Only
a policy of open borders would successfully tackle gender injustice in immigration
and, most importantly, eﬀectively address the worrying intersection between
gender vulnerability in immigration and gender oppression in marriage. It is only
when would-be immigrant women are allowed to freely enter and settle in the
prospective receiving state that they can have more substantial opportunities to
negotiate the terms of the eventual personal relationships they establish there.27
Obviously, one can make an intrinsic argument for open borders, i.e. an argu-
ment independent of achieving gender equality under non-idealised conditions.28
Nevertheless, the point is that even when such an argument is unavailable, we have
strong reasons to strive for an open-borders regime by considering the great extent
to which immigration inﬂuences the vulnerability women experience in marriage.
Therefore, compared to Brake’s ‘two-stage’ theorisation, theorising marriage and
its intersection with the gender sphere of immigration by starting from non-
idealised conditions would entail more radical changes to immigration than the
ones MM acknowledges. This is because, through this methodology, the advance-
ment of gender would not be constrained by those assumptions or idealisations
made under a prior idealised context.29 According to the non-idealised theorisation
of marriage, conceiving of changes in immigration law as an integral component of
the project of regulating adult intimate relationships in a just fashion entails
moving beyond the understandable concern for family reuniﬁcation.30 It implies
questioning the very existence of borders on the grounds of gender equality, or
better, on the basis of how existing immigration regimes worsen gender vulner-
ability and oppression in marriage.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that feminist accounts of the institutional reform of
marriage should start from non-idealised conditions. I criticised recent liberal
accounts of marriage and challenged the ways in which these accounts theorise
the institution of marriage. I have shown that to promote gender equality and
reduce gender vulnerability, (civil) marriage cannot be disestablished for practical
and expressive reasons. I have argued that for such reform to be successful, it
should be theorised by following feminist methodological premises, particularly
by starting from the non-idealised conditions in which women live and focusing
on the intersection of marriage and various spheres of gender injustice. From this
methodology, I have proposed some important recommendations on how marriage
should be reformed. In particular, I have considered how immigration law spills
over into the issue of marriage justice and argued that, precisely on the basis of the
actual conditions of gender inequality and vulnerability, marriage justice entails
open borders. I have shown how such a theorisation of marriage is potentially more
promising than the one recently proposed by Brake, who starts from idealised
conditions and only at a second stage focuses on non-ideal constraints. The
former is less likely to sacriﬁce gender equality for other goals pursued under
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idealised conditions, and it notes the necessity of more radical changes in those
institutions intersecting with marriage. This is a signiﬁcant conclusion to reach
because, as I have already mentioned, non-ideal theory is potentially complicit
with the status quo, whereas ideal theory is considered a more eﬀective tool for
criticism. Nevertheless, as I have shown, non-ideal, feminist-driven theorising is a
powerful normative vehicle for change.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Anne Phillips for discussing some of the ideas that ended up in this
paper. Thanks also to Laura Davy and Anne Ruddlesen with whom I had really interesting
conversations on feminism and marriage during our time as graduate students. I am ﬁnally
grateful to Gabriele Badano who extensively and critically commented on numerous ver-
sions of this paper while also never failing to give me his unconditional support.
Funding
I wish to thank the University of Cambridge (Cambridge Home & European Scholarship
Scheme) and Pembroke College for supporting my research while this paper was prepared.
Notes
1. For seminal feminist critiques of the institution of marriage, see: Pateman (1988:
184–185); Fineman (1995: 5); Card (1996).
2. For example, see: Sadler (2008); Sunstein and Thaler (2008); Metz (2010); March (2011);
Brake (2012).
3. For feminist critiques of the liberal traditional tendency to leave the chauvinism of
marriage unquestioned, see: Pateman (1988: 154–188); Brown (1995: 135–165); Okin
(1989: 134–169). Within the liberal tradition, there are obviously some exceptions –
famously, John Stuart Mill (2006 [1869]).
4. As an example of this way of interpreting feminist liberalism, see: Abbey (2011: 8).
5. Metz (2010: 156–159) and Brake (2012: 109–206) clearly state that their accounts of
marriage are meant to be appealing to liberals and feminists.
6. Some have criticised Okin for not paying attention to how the institution of marriage
should be modified to render it less heteronormative and more egalitarian (Young, 1997:
101; Jaggar, 2009a: 172). I argue that her insight into the interconnection between
various spheres of gender injustice should be one of the methodological starting
points for a feminist theorisation of marriage.
7. For a contractual model of the disestablishment of marriage, see: Ristroph and Murray
(2010).
8. Similarly, see: March (2011: 11).
9. I use the term ‘privatisation’ synonymously with ‘disestablishment’. In such proposals,
both the disestablishment and the privatisation of marriage mean that the word ‘mar-
riage’ would be deployed only for unions ratified by private and, in particular, religious
associations.
10. For an account of how the state can change adult relationships through the institution
of marriage, see: Shanley (2004: 6).
11. Metz argues that parenting should also be conferred with such ‘intimate care giving
union status’ (2010: 121). Owing to the different agency of the subjects involved,
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endorsing the same legal framework to regulate both parenting and adult relationships is
troubling (Brake, 2012: 145–151; Shrage, 2013: 11–12).
12. On the shortcomings resulting from giving to private associations full control over what
marriage means, see: Brake (2012: 145–151); Shrage (2013: 11–12).
13. See, for example, the comments made by the Italian progressive Bishop Giuseppe
Fiorini Morosini (Gessa, 2012).
14. In the UK, although civil partnerships granting same-sex couples the majority of the
same rights and responsibilities of marriage were legalised in 2004, major campaigns,
such as the Coalition for Equal Marriage and Out4Marriage, organised by LGBT and
other associations, took place until the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 was
passed.
15. Note that this does not mean that the state should regulate adult personal relationships
only through civil marriage. The state should also offer alternative arrangements to
those adults who do not want to enter into marriage. The theorisation of the types of
arrangements is beyond the scope of this article. Here, I simply assume that, as for
marriage, such theorisation should proceed by starting from non-ideal circumstances
and consider the intersection of the various spheres of gender injustice with these
arrangements.
16. At least two further important liberal contributions on marriage – i.e., Clare Chamber’s
account of the ‘marriage-free State’ (2013) and Stephen Macedo’s defense of the institu-
tion of marriage (2015) – have come out by the time this paper was finalized. Therefore,
I am unfortunately unable to discuss them in detail. I will just limit myself to point out
that (i) Chamber’s argument for the abolition of marriage misses the progressive expres-
sive significance that marriage would have in certain contexts, while (ii) Macedo’s
defense of the institution of marriage, based on the alleged value of monogamy for
liberal stability, seems to sit uncomfortably with feminist tenets.
17. For an influential account of structural groups, see: Young (2000: 92–93).
18. On the centrality of gender equality in feminist theorising, see e.g.: Young (1997: 5);
Schwartzman (2006: 165); Zerilli (2009: 295).
19. On the importance of reflecting upon how different spheres of gender inequality inter-
sect when analysing women’s condition, see: Okin (1989: 134–170); Jaggar (2009b:
38–45); Young (2009).
20. On how feminist theory should start from women’s actual conditions, see, for example:
MacKinnon (1989: 120); Young (1997: 5); Nussbaum (1999: 6); Hirschmann (2003: 222);
Schwartzman (2006: 167).
21. Here I follow Ingrid Robeyns’s definition of what counts as a bad idealisation in
normative theory (2008: 358).
22. Some scholars contend that if we include too many factual constraints while elaborating
normative principles, we are likely to come up with principles that support (rather than
challenge) the status quo (see, e.g., Valentini, 2012: 659). Recently, Lisa Tessman has
moved a different type of criticism to non-ideal theory; she argues that, because of their
focus on action-guidance, many supporters of non-ideal theory end up neglecting that
there are wrongs that cannot be rectified and that there are situations in which right
choices are simply unavailable to moral agents (2010: 809). I will not deal with
Tessman’s criticism here.
23. I do not contend that theorising the justice of marriage requires that a fully-fledged
proposal be put forward on all the changes needed in those spheres of gender injustice
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affecting marriage. Here, and through the example of the intersection between marriage
and immigration law, I argue that theorising marriage justice entails indicating how such
changes should be normatively theorised. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me
on this point.
24. A UK sponsorship is also usually required to apply for an entering visa from abroad.
25. Rather than reducing the number of years required for spouses (or legally recognised
partners) to apply for the indefinite right to remain, the UK government has recently
extended the period from two to five years (UK Border Agency, 2013).
26. I thank an anonymous referee for comments here.
27. One may stretch this argument to contend that because other groups of persons, along
with women, suffer from serious vulnerabilities in immigration, states should open their
borders to them. In a liberal vein, one can argue that to respect neutrality, the open
borders regime should be universal. Although I am sympathetic to these two claims,
a full defence of them cannot be pursued in this article.
28. For a highly influential intrinsic case for open borders, see: Carens (1987).
29. One can theorise marriage in an idealised society and assume the eradication of borders
in the theorisation. However, a feminist theorisation of marriage under non-idealised
conditions allows conceiving its reform and the changes to other institutions intersecting
with it only on the basis of gender equality. In other words, it avoids having to weigh
this goal against other assumptions and/or commitments made under idealised
conditions.
30. Revoking the privilege accorded to legally recognised relationships within immigration,
as a solution to the discussed problems, would create further injustices, preventing
individuals from reunifying with their significant others (Abrams, 2009: 59).
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